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I NT RO DU CTI ON 
Any group, regardless of the number or composition of that 
particular group, has shortcomings. An organizational body is 
capable of rendering either positive or negative decisions 
depending upon how the individual group members interact and 
cooperate with one another. 
The members of any policy-making group are subject to various 
types of pressures, and it is pertinent to consider how these 
constraints influence the decision-making process. Irving Janis 
(1972) asserted that intense social pressures toward uniformity 
and in-group loyalty within decision-making groups can build to 
the point where they seriously interfere with both cognitive 
efficiency and moral judgment. Janis termed this phenomenon 
11 Groupthink 11 and postulated initially that groupthink occurs: 
(1) When independent critical analysis of the problem facing the 
group assumes second place to the group members' motivation to 
maintain the solidarity of the group, and (2) When group members 
avoid creating any possible disunity (by hesitating to express 
unpopular doubts or opinions which .may serve to undermine the 
workings of the group). 
In . several case studies of major foreign policy decisions 
executed by the United States government, Janis strived to trace 
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the social pressures toward groupthink on decision-making. In 
addition to describing the components of groupthink relevant to 
each foreign policy decision, Janis suggested possible preventive 
techniques to forestall or eliminate groupthink. 
Janis wrote, 11 To understand the predispositions conducive to 
groupthink, we need studies of groups that meet weekly and work 
together on decisions to which each member will be committed" (1983, 
p. 242). Phillip Tetlock (1979) similarly stated the following 
regarding further research on groupthink: "Draw upon case studies 
in historical and/or political science literature to identify a much 
larger sample of probable groupthink and non-groupthink decisions" 
(p. 1323). Tetlock continued, "There is a need for research that 
analyzes verbatim records of actual group deliberations. A more 
conclusive test of the groupthink analysis awaits the declassification 
of such documents" (1979, p. 1324). 
Background Research 
Group conformity and group polarization are two facets of 
group research which are similar in many respects to groupthink. 
Several theorists have researched these topics and consequently 
have proposed different explanations for particular dimensions 
and interactions of group decision-making. Many of these theories 
have overlapping parameters of commonality, and it is these aspects 
·-. 
of group decision-making and group dynamics in general which will 
be discussed. 
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Conformity refers to going along with group pressures, and it 
is implicit in the way that psychologists use the term that the 
individual, if left entirely alone, would behave in some other way. 
The line between conformity and conventionality is quite a fragile 
one, and possibly a meaningful way to distinguish between the two 
is to consider the situation and the effect of the behavior on the 
individual. However, it is not possible to distinguish between 
conventionality and conformity without knowing about the individual 
and the situation. 
Numerous researchers have attempted to explain conformity. 
Festinger (1954) proposed a social comparison theory and asserted 
that there is a basic drive within each of us to evaluate our own 
abilities and opinions. The social comparison theory states that 
the opinions of others also provide a social reality for the 
validation of those opinions. Festinger concluded that more 
individual conformity will result when an individual responds in 
public rather than in a private setting. In other words, individuals 
do not wish to feel differently from or to disagree with, those 
individuals whom they perceive as similar to them. 
Asch was interested in some of the conditions that induce 
individuals to yield to group or social pressures or to remain 
independent when those pressures are contrary to fact. Research 
such as that -performed by Asch (1956) suggests that the tendency 
for an individual to accept others' opinions when these contradict 
the testimony of one's own senses is stronger the more closely 
certain conditions are met. These conditions include: (1) The 
quality of the evidence presented by others must be compelling, 
(2) The stimulus being judged is ambiguous, (3) The subject's 
confidence in the correctness of his/her own perception is low, 
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(4) The discrepancy between one's own opinion and the opinions of 
others is large (but not dramatically large), and (5) The subject 
knows that others are aware that his/her opinion differs from their 
own. 
Richard Crutchfield (1955) refined the study of conformity advanced 
earlier by Asch. Using different experimental conditions, 
Crutchfield approached the conformity issue more methodically. 
He showed that individuals will yield to group pressure even on 
opinion or attitude items that were of high social relevance to 
them. For example, in a sample of 50 military officers, when 
questioned privately, not one of them agreed with the statement, 
"I doubt whether I would make a good leader." However, under 
group pressure, 37% of the officers agreed with the statement. 
Crutchfield discovered that there was more yielding on difficult 
items (ones in which the individual is initially uncertain) than on 
easy ones. Crutchfield found, as did Asch, that there are extremely 
large individual differerices in yielding. 
Asch and 'Crutchfield were both studying conformity behavior. 
These two researchers both had several people gather together, and 
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the subjects in both experiments received feedback that unanimously 
contradicted their perception(s). But the two situations were not 
identical. Asch's subjects faced the majority and heard them 
reveal their judgments, whereas Crutchfield's subjects could 
not see the oth~r individuals and received their judgments 
via a lighted panel. Deutsch and Gerard (1955) and Levy (1960) 
have shown that when the types of items are identical, there is 
more yielding in the Asch situation than in the one developed by 
Crutchfield. 
In psychological areas, interest in group standards was 
probably first stimulated by Sherif (1967). Sherif's approach 
was basically to restrict laboratory work to small, carefully 
designed studies of perceptual differences as they related to 
group interaction. Festinger (1952) experimented and wrote a 
subsequent article titled, "Some consequences of de-individuation 
in a group." His experiment differed from .the experiments of Sherif 
in the respect that Festinger attempted to include several more 
groups (23 groups ranging in size from four to seven}, and 
Festinger•s purpose was to answer a more global question. 
Festinger was more concerned with examining when and why 
individuals seem to behave differently by themselves as opposed 
to when they were placed in group situations. Numerous other 
experimental designs were proposed and conducted in the 1950s. 
However, the decade beginning with 1960 introduced new experimental 
research questions to be explored. 
Levy (1960) conducted an experiment titled "Studies in 
Conformity Behavior: A Methodological Note. 11 Levy attempted 
to answer the following research question: 11 Are subjects who 
give answers verbally, face-to-face with a group, exposed to 
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the same degree of pressure to conform as those placed in a 
semi-anonymous booth?" Although his conclusions did not reflect 
what was originally proposed, the results were nevertheless 
informative and instructive to fellow researchers. Levy 
concluded that the laboratory situation created by Crutchfield 
was far less effective than the original face-to-face situation 
created by Asch. Levy cited three reasons for this conclusion. 
The first concerned the drop in conformity responses (a reduction 
previously noted by Deutsch and Gerard); the second reason was 
that a large number of subjects uniformly expressed some 
suspicion that the experimental situation was rigged; and 
finally, the tendency to conform was not found to be a stable 
effect in Levy's study. 
Gerard (1964) replicated Asch's 1956 experiment and 
investigated the question of whether or not an individual 
who asserts his or her independence at the outset (in the face 
of successive disagreement with others), tends to remain 
independent over time. Ge~ard concluded that there was both 
greater adamance and greater' yielding with public confrontation. 
There was greater commitment to the behavior in a public 
situation whether due to yielding or independence. 
Schulman (1967) studied Asch's prior experiments and 
subsequently designed his study as a recheck of some of the 
variables utilized by Asch. Two main ·points in Schulman's 
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study were of particular interest to group conformity researchers. 
Schulman's findings: (1) Re-emphasized again the need for 
considering the effect of the subject-experimenter relationship 
in experimental designs, and (2) Suggested the need for re-
interpreting the large number of studies that had sought to 
relate variables such as status and personality to conformity 
to the group, using the rate of conformity responses in the 
Asch situation as the dependent measure. Schulman also found 
that "in contrast to previous interpretations, the data indicate 
that behavior in the Asch situation is a function of three types 
of influence: informational conformity, normative conformity 
to the group, and normative conformity to the experimenter." 
In 1968, researchers Julian, Regula, and Hollander 
investigated the relationship. between an individual's 
conformity to the judgments of others in a group and the prior 
agreement or support which these others have shown him or her in 
making .similar judgments. The major conclusion of the experiment 
was that prior· support or agreement from others will increase the 
likelihood of the individual's subsequent agreement or conformity 
to the group. 11 This tendency to reciprocate support is also 
implied in the widely-accepted relationship between group 
cohesiveness and conformity 11 (Back, 1951; Schachter, 1951). 
Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) compared opinion and 
judgment ratings of subjects in individual and collective 
situations. They reiterated that a number of research findings 
tended to support the notions that 11 (a) individuals in a social 
situation avoid expressing extreme opinions or judgments, and 
(b) the consensus represents an averaging, a compromise among 
individual positions on opinion 11 Moscovici and Zavalloni 
quoted the conclusion of Kelley and Thibaut (1954) who stated 
that, "Wh i1 e reacting with other persons, the person reacts to 
them ... by tempering his judgments so as to avoid the 
possibility of being extremely different from others." (p. 769) 
Researchers Moscivici and Zavalloni (1969) elaborated upon 
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the "risky shift" activity as originally proposed by Stoner (1961). 
This discovery by Stoner demonstrated that when discussing problems 
concerning loss of money, prestige, or self satisfaction, groups 
tend to prefer a riskier alternative than one which would have 
resulted from a compromise between the choices of the individuals 
comprising these groups. In other terms, groups accept higher 
levels of risk than do the individuals who make up the group. 
The results of ·the Moscivici and Zavalloni study were: (a) group 
discussion to consensus results in a polarization of responses, 
(b) the polarization effect will be greater when the group must 
commit itself to a given position, than when it is asked to 
express an 11 objective 11 judgment, and (c) the opinions and 
judgments expressed by the group consensus will often be 
adopted by the individuals as their personal opinions. 
The phenomenon of polarization has been studied in the 
context of clinical psychology and of cognitive response style 
(Hamilton, 1968; O'Donovan, 1965). 
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As Sherif and Sherif (1967) noted, "Extremity of position is 
frequently identified by psychologists in this country as a sign 
0 f Path 0 l 0 gy • II ( P • 119 ) 
Since the introduction by Stoner (1961) of "risky shift, 11 much 
controversy has evolved as to what extent this is a group decision-
making process and to what extent riskier decisions are in fact 
made by individuals. Dean Pruitt (1971) in his discussion of 
choice shifts maintained that "in view of the evidence that 
shifts toward caution occur reliably in group discussions of 
certain issues, the earlier notion that groups always take more 
risk ·than individuals must be abandoned." {p. 339) In view of 
this revelation, theories which have particular relevancy when 
discussing "choice shifts" must be identified. Several of these 
theories and their components will therefore be enumerated in 
alphabetical order. 
Diffusion -of- Responsibility Theory - Group experience 
will reduce anxiety about the possible negative 
consequences of making the riskier decision. This 
reduction in anxiety makes it possible to accept the 
risky alternatives at a lower probability of success. 
Familiarization Theory - Increased familiarity with the 
items and/or subject matter should make people more 
willing to take risks on these items (because of a 
general reduction in areas of uncertainty). 
Leadership Theory - Attributes the risky-shift to a 
sensation of greater confidence and assertiveness on 
the part of the high risk taker. The group will therefore 
shift toward its most confident member. Another tenet of 
this theory postulates that higher risk takers are more 
persuasive in group discussions that produce a risky 
shift. 
Pluralistic-Ignorance Theory - On risk-oriented items, 
inidividuals are in conflict between an ideal of risk 
and a cautious assumed group standard. Cautious 
behavior, not risky behavior, is attributed to an 
assumed group norm. This theory attributes the group-
induced shift to a revised perception of where others 
stand on the item in question and assume that decisions 
will always, on the average, be somewhat in the valued 
dir~ction of where others are perceived to stand. 
Release Theory - The individual will follow the group 
consensus in those conditions where the consensus 
favors the value orientation of the item or subject 
matter. The 11 release mechanism" should reinforce the 
pressure of group consensus (in those conditions where 
the consensus favors the value orientation of the item). 
Relevant-Arguments Theory - Considerable evidence exists 
to support this particular choice-shift theory. A major 
explanation for this theory holds that arguments produce 
utility changes which produce shifts in risk taking. 
One aspect of this theory is that when arguments are 
written down by the individual while working alone -
these particular arguments will significantly influence 
his/her s~bsequent opinion in the matter. 
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Risky-Shift Phenomenon - A positive correlation exists 
between group cohesiveness and the size of the risky-
shift. Also, emotional bonds among group members 
encourage the risky shift. However, evidence has 
been gathered to discount some of these findings, 
i . e. , 1 Much of the evidence for the existence of a 
risky shift involves hypothetical dilemma problems. 
Since these problems do not entail real outcomes, it 
is hard to see how the capacity to shift responsibility 
for these outcomes onto the shoulders of others can have 
any effect on behavior. 1 (Lamm, 1967) 
Social Comparison Theory - Includes the following four 
propositions: (a) Perceptions of the decisions made 
by others shift toward risk on risk-oriented items and 
toward caution on caution-oriented items, {b) After 
discussion, others are seen as more cautious than 
oneself on risk-oriented items, {c) Shifts in the 
perception of where others may stand are larger and 
more reliable than shifts in personal preference, 
and (d) Group members who start out at a ldwer level 
of risk, shift further on risk-oriented items and less 
on cautious-oriented items. (Groups converge as they 
shift and therefore all such shifts provide support for 
any choice shift theory). 
Utility Decision Theory - Arguments heard in a group 
discussion will produce utility changes which, in turn, 
produce shifts. (This is a version of the 'relevant-
arguments 1 theory). Research studies have provided 
evidence that: '(a) Decisions on choice-dilemma items, 
both before and after discusssion, can be predicted 
from knowledge of the utilities assigned to the 
outcomes, (b) group-induced shifts in individual risk 
taking can be predicted from changes in utilities, and 
(c) group discussions about how to rate the utilities 
of the outcomes induce shifts that are comparable in 
direction and size to those produced by conventional 
discussions of what level of risk to take.' (Burnstein, 
et al., 1969) · 
Values Theories - Groups shift · in a direction toward 
which most memb~rs of the group are already attracted 
as · individuals. 'The conception of the shift as a 
change in attitude seems compatible with all existing 
theories of this phenomenon. I (Pruitt, 1971, p. 345). 
Five theories are included under the 'Values Theory' 
dimension: (1) Social Comparison, (2) Pluralistic-
Ignorance, (3) Release, (4) Relevant-Arguments, and 
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(5) Commitment. The following explanations will 
correspond to the theories as numbered previously. 
(1) 'Riskiness' is a culturally-prescribed value or 
ego ideal which causes the typical American to want 
to be at least as risky in his behavior as other 
people similar to him. 
(2) Relates to a situation in which the members of 
a group embrace one attitude but believe that others 
embrace another. 
(3) Relates to the attitude or belief that most group 
members will assume this 'risky-shift' - after they've 
discovered a single group member (the model) who 
endorses high risk-taking; and thereby releases the 
more cautious group members from the assumed social 
constraints that are holding them back from risk taking. 
(4) Relates to the notion that the dominant value or 
values in a decision problem elicit persuasive 
arguments in group discussion that convince group 
members to move further in the direction of these 
values. . 
(5) In the commitment dimension, the following occurs: 
'In the course of handling the information, as he 
interacts with real or imaginary interlocutors, he 
chooses alternatives, binds himself to the choice, 
and thus commits himself to the work he is doing. 
Such a commitment is assumed to move the individual 
further in the direction of his initial decision, 
that is, toward risk in the case of risk-oriented 
items and toward caution in the case of caution-
oriented items.' (Pruitt, 1971) 
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Beginning in the mid 1960s, researchers who were continuing 
to investigate group decision-making processes altered the manner 
in which they perceived group dynamics. The "risky shift" 
occurrence gradually was viewed differently, and the term 
"group polarization" became the designation which described 
processe~ involved when groups attempted to reach decisions. 
The term "group .polarization" driginated from the writings of 
Serge Moscovici and his colleagues (Moscovici and Zavalloni, 1969). 
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The group polarization hypothesis was stated thusly by Moscovici, 
11 The average postgroup response will tend to be more extreme in the 
same direction as the average of the pregroup responses." (p. 128) 
Polarization refers to an increase in the extremity of the average 
reponse of the subject polarization and this use of "polarization" 
is a somewhat specialized one. Moscovici reiterated the importance 
of distinguishing polarization from extremization. Whereas 
polarization refers to shifts toward the already preferred pole, 
extremization refers to movement away from neutrality, regardless 
of the direction. Since all instances of group polarization are 
instances of extremization, but not vice versa, extremization is 
occasionally easier to demonstrate than polarization. It should 
also be noted that conclusions about group polarization need not 
necessarily apply to individuals. The conclusion offered by 
Roseborough (1953) regarding the state of knowledge regarding 
groups and their problem-solving dynamics seems appropriate even 
in this decade: 11 We need not be further persuaded that group 
discussion processes have an effect on individual performance 
even though there is a selective process occurring in the reporting 
of studies. This proof has only opened up new and troublesome 
problems concerning the mechanism by .which this influence is 
achieved and the conditions under which such an empirical 
obs e rv at i on ho ;-d s . 11 ( p . 2 7 9 ) 
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The goal then is to ascertain and understand polarization in 
such a way that will account for the known conditions under which 
such group polarization occurred. Much of the subsequent research 
involved choice-dilemmas research. In general, they suggested that a 
subject changes when he discovers that others share similar inclin-
ations more than he would have supposed. (Either because the group 
norm is discovered to be more in the direction which was originally 
preferred, or because the subject is released to more strongly act 
out his preference after observing someone else who models it more 
extremely than himself). 
Prior to reporting several findings regarding group polarization, 
the following statement by McGuire (1969) elucidates quite well 
certain reasons to investigate this area of group process. McGuire 
noted, "It is clear that any impact that the mass media have on 
opinion is less than that produced by informal face-to-face 
communication, of the person with his primary groups, his family, 
friends, co-workers, and neighbors. In social interaction the 
target person is motivated to present himself favorably, and he is 
engaged in active cognitive rehearsal and verbal commitment. Thus, 
it is not surprising that, in Western culture, group discussions 
seem increasingly integral to our social and organizational 
existence." (p. 231) 
At this interval, the term 11 Groupthink 11 will be introduced 
and explained. Both group polarization and the concept of 
groupthink have overlapping qualities which significantly affect 
group decision-making procedures. A detailed description of 
groupthink will follow. 
11 Groupthink 11 is the process that occurs when decision-making 
bodies agree for the sake of agreeing and consequently abandon 
their critical judgment. As defined by Janis (1982), groupthink 
is a mode of thinking "that people engage in when they are deeply 
involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members' strivings for 
unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action." Groupthink refers to the 
deterioration of the mental efficiency, of reality testing of 
alternatives, and moral judgment that results directly from the 
in-group pressures. 
Janis (1983) lists the following eight symptoms which 
characterize groupthink or "concurrence-seeking" tendencies: 
1. An illusion of invulnerability, shared by most or 
all of the members, which creates excessive optimism 
and encourages taking extreme risks; 
2. Collective efforts to rationalize in order to 
discount warnings which might lead the members 
to reconsider their assumptions before they 
commit themselves to their past policy decisions. 
3. An unquestioned belief in the group's inherent 
morality, inclining the members to ignore the 
. ethical or moral consequences of their decisions; 
4. Stereotyped views of rivals and enemies as too 
evil to warrant genuine attempts to negotiate, or 
as too stupid to counter whatever risky attempts 
are made to defeat their purposes; 
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5. Direct pressure on any member who expresses strong 
arguments against any of the group's stereotypes, 
illusions, or commitments, making clear that such 
dissent is contrary to what is expected of all 
loyal members; 
6. Self-censorship of deviations from the apparent 
group consensus, reflecting each member's 
inclination to minimize to himself the importance 
of his doubts and counterarguments; 
7. A shared illusion of unanimity, partly resulting 
from this self-censorship and augmented by the 
false assumption that silence implies consent; 
8. The emergence of self-appointed 11 mindguards 11 -
members who protect the group from adverse 
information that might shatter their shared 
complacency about the effectiveness and morality 
of their decisions. 
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Janis (1982) further delineates seven major defects in decision-
making which further contribute to failures to solve problems 
adequately. These include: (1) The group's discussions are 
limited to a few alternative courses of action (often only two) 
without a survey of the full range of alternatives; (2) The group 
does not survey the objectives to. be fulfilled and the values 
implicated by the choice; (3) The group fails to reexamine the 
course of action initially preferred by the majority of members; 
(4) The members neglect courses of action initially evaluated as 
unsatisfactory by the majority of the .group (they spend little or 
no time d.iscussing whether or not they have overlooked possible 
alternatives); (5) The members make little or no attempt to 
obtain information from experts who can supply sound estimates 
of losses and gains to be expected from alternative courses of 
action; (6) Selective bias is shown in the way that the group 
reacts to factual information and relevant judgments from 
experts, the mass media, and other outside critics; and 
(7) The members spend little time deliberating about how the 
chosen policy might be hindered by bureaucratic inertia, 
sabotaged by political opponents, or temporarily derailed by the 
common accidents that happen to the best of well-conceived plans. 
Darwin Cartwright (1968) summarized the research of social 
psychologists who investigated the effects that cohesiveness 
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exerts upon a decision-making group. Cartwright ~oncluded that, 
"Other things being equal, as cohesiveness increases there is an 
increase in a group's capacity to retain members and in the degree 
of participation by members in group activities. The greater a 
group's cohesiveness, the more power it has to bring about conformity 
to its norms and to gain acceptance of its goals and assignment to 
tasks and roles. Finally, highly cohesive groups provide a source 
of security for members which serves to reduce anxiety and to 
heighten self-esteem." 
In concurrence with Cartwright, Janis (1982) stated that the 
central theme of his groupthink phenomenon could be summarized 
thusly: "The more amiability and esprit de corps among the 
members ·of a policy-making in-group, the greater is the danger 
that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, 
which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions 
directed toward out-groups." 
Suedfeld and Tetlock (1977) researched international crises 
in the context of how decision-makers processed information prior 
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to and during the particular crisis. They discovered that prolonged 
stress decreased the complexity of information processing. Also, 
decision makers became concerned with short-range solutions and 
saw their freedom of action being increasingly restricted while 
that of their adversaries appeared to be increasingly wider. Their 
main conclusions regarding the information processing and the 
complexity of such information discussed among policy makers were 
that: (1) International crises that resulted in war were 
characterized by lower levels of communicative complexity than 
those that were resolved peacefully; and (2) Changes in complexity 
·as the climax approached showed a decrease prior to the outbreak 
of war and an increase prior to a peaceful solution being obtained. 
Burnstein and Vinokur (1977) investigated the merits of the 
"persuasive-arguments" theory. One of their premises was that 
polarization will be maximal when a person begins to rethink the 
issue, and many arguments remain that have not yet come to mind, 
or when several individuals discuss the issue with each other and 
not all of them have thought of the same arguments. They mentioned 
that when a series of arguments is leirned prior to discussion, 
recall of a particular argument will depend on its position in the 
series. Furthe~more, polarization and convergence occur simultaneously 
and the typical finding was that during discussion the most extreme 
member moves to a relatively moderate position, while the next 
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extreme member hardly changes at all_ According to the persuasive-
arguments theory, attitude polarization is fundamentally an 
informational phenomenon. Their findings suggested that: 
(1) social comparison does little to enhance or sustain polarization, 
(2) polarization depends upon a capacity to generate persuasive 
arguments, and (3) that this capacity is diminished when the 
person either is presented with an issue about which he has little 
knowledge or is prevented from thinking about the issue. 
John Courtright (1978) studied the groupthink circumstance in 
a laboratory setting. His results agreed with Janis' groupthink 
concepts and supported the groupthink theory. Courtwright 
concluded that highly cohesive groups have significantly less 
disagreement than low-cohesive groups. Perhaps more importantly, 
this study indicated that the presence or absence of disagreement 
(conflict, hostility) among group members may be the best 
discriminator between groupthink and non-groupthink groups. 
Allen and Wilder (1980) mentioned that previous discussions of 
conformity had focused primarily on the role of motivational and 
social factors. They proposed that group consensus produces 
conformity in an indirect manner by modifying the meaning of the 
stimulus itself. Stated more generally, they asserted that the 
meaning ·attributed to a stimulus is influenced by the context in 
which it appears. The conclusion was that a change in the 
meaning of the stimuli was, in fact, responsible for a shift in 
opinion. A person therefore would reinterpret the meaning 
of the stimulus object when faced with unpopular responses from 
a unanimous group, and this change in meaning would lead to a 
shift toward the position of the group. 
Bray and Chilstrom (1982) reevaluated an earlier study 
performed by Hollander (1964) in which Hollander proposed that 
"a group member holding a minority position must conform 
initially to the majority position and show competence before 
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being allowed not to conform to majority beliefs later." The 
essence of Hollander's model was that deviant opinions or actions 
would be most likely to be accepted by members of the majority 
when the holder of the deviant opinion(s) attained sufficient 
status in the group. Bray and Chilstrom then compared Hollander's 
findings with those of the Moscovici study (1972), where Moscovici 
suggested that the minority member must consistently and resolutely 
not conform from the outset. Conclusions were mixed. For males, 
results showed that Hollander's model produced significantly 
greater influence. But for females, both the Moscovici and 
Hollander models proved equally effective, regardless of competence. 
Insko, Drenan, et al. (1982) explored conformity as a function 
of positive self-evaluation with being liked and being right. 
Their · results indicated that conformity is a joint function of 
the concern with being liked and the concern with being right. 
Subjects conformed more with public than with private responding, 
and also when they were led to believe that the relationships 
between objects were objectively determined rather than 
undetermined. 
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Mackie and Cooper (1984) investigated the effect of group 
membership on attitude polarization. In their study they quoted 
Wetherell and Turner (1979) who suggested that, "Individuals who 
become aware of their group membership search via information 
exchange and social comparison for the definitional or criterial 
traits and norms that distinguish their group from others." The 
norms that individuals perceive as "group-definitional" tend to 
become polarized to the extreme. Consistent with this idea, 
Daise (1969) has shown that identification with the group enhances 
both occurrence and magnitude of polarization. The main 
conclusion of the Mackie and Cooper (1984) study was that 
group membership exerted more control over polarization than 
informational exchange per se. Polarization occurred when 
subjects listened to what they believed to be their own group, 
regardless of similarity with the other members. 
Wilder (1984) explored the concept of intergroup contact and 
cited evidence in literature that face-to-face contact can be 
effective in improving intergroup relationships if the contact 
occuri under cooperative conditions. Wilder produced a mixed 
-.. 
finding regarding the evaluation of an out-group member by the 
members of an in-group. 
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Members of a negatively evaluated out-group are in a bind. 
On the one hand, information that strengthens their association 
with their group should also strengthen the favorable impact of 
successful contact on evaluations of their group as a whole. But 
to the extent they appear to be typical of the out-group, they risk 
confirming unfavorable stereotypes about the out-group, thereby 
jeopardizing evaluations of themselves as individuals. On the 
other hand, information that weakens their association with the 
out-group may encourage more favorable evaluations of themselves 
as individuals. But to the extent that they appear to be atypical 
of their group, successful contact should have less impact on 
evaluations of their group. 
Stasser and Titus (1985) proposed that decision-making 
groups can potentially benefit from pooling members' information, 
particularly when members individually have partial and biased 
information (but collectively can compose an _ unbiased impression 
of the possible alternatives). Several theoretical perspectives 
have emphasized the role of information exchange in guiding the 
developing of a consensus while modifying members' preferences 
during group discussion (e.g., Anderson and Graesser, 1976; 
Hoffman and Maier, 1964; Kaplan, 1977; Stasser and Davis, 1981). 
Unique · arguments are considered particularly instrumental in 
producing preference shifts. In these researchers' findings, 
Stasser and Titus discovered that the unshared information will 
tend to be omitted from discussion and, therefore, will have 
little effect on members' preferences during group discussion. 
Furthermore, discussion did not increase the recall of unshared 
information. 
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Moreland (1985) stated that recent research on intergroup 
relations had shown that categorizing subjects into social groups 
was often enough to produce strong in-group, out-group biases 
(Brewer, 1979; Tajfel, 1978; Wilder, 1981). Moreland preferred 
to examine how new group members are assimilated into the decision-
making process. Newcomers in real groups are usually eager to be 
accepted by oldtimers, so they avoid behaving in ways that might 
inhibit their assimilation into the group (Ziller, 1964). Many 
groups have explicit norms regarding the acceptance of new group 
members. Conclusions ascertained included that real newcomers 
often interacted more frequently and positively with one another 
than they did with oldtimers; conflict within a group can be 
facilitated simply by making differences among the members of 
that group more salient; and members of a minority clique are 
more likely to favor one another over other group members when 
their clique is fairly small and hence distinctive. 
Giammarino and Wright (1986) investigated social status 
in small groups utilizing personality traits or features of 
the individual. Although the study employed school-age subjects, 
some of _the conclusions have implications for other age segments. 
Most appropriate was the finding that measures of traits such as 
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honesty, aggression, and conscientiousness displayed less 
consistency than expected. Many studies, for example, have 
demonstrated a positive relationship between popularity and 
social competencies but the negative behaviors (e.g., aggression) 
and unpopularity have not been illustrated as consistently. 
Although citing the need for further research prior to 
claiming absolute predictibility, Janis (1983) proposed the 
following prescriptions for preventing groupthink: 
1. The leader of a policy-making group should assign 
the role of critical evaluator to each member, 
encouraging the group to give high priority to airing 
objections and doubts. 
2. The leaders in an organizations' hierarchy, when 
assigning a policy-planning mission to a group, 
should be impartial instead of stating preferences 
and expectations at the outset. 
3. The organization should routinely follow the 
administrative practice of setting up several 
independent policy-planning and evaluation 
groups to work on the same policy question, 
each carrying out its deliberations. under a 
different leader. 
4. Throughout the period when the feasibility and 
effectiveness of policy alternatives are being 
surveyed, the policy-making group should from 
time to time divide into two or more subgroups 
to meet separately, under different chairpersons, 
and then come together to hammer out differences. 
5. Each member of the policy-making group should 
discuss periodically the group's deliberations 
with trusted associates in his or her own unit 
of the organization and report back to their 
reactions. 
6. One or more outside experts or qualified colleagues 
within the organization who are not core members of 
the policy-making group should be invited to each 
meeting on a staggered basis and should be 
encouraged to challenge the views of core 
members. 
7. At every meeting devoted to evaluating policy 
alternatives, at least one member should be 
assigned the role of devil's advocate. 
8. Whenever the policy issue involves relations 
with the rival organization, a sizable block 
of time should be spent surveying all warning 
signals from the rivals and constructing 
alternative scenarios of the rivals' intentions. 
9. After reaching a preliminary consensus, the 
group should hold a "second chance" meeting at 
which the members are expected to express as 
vividly as they can all doubts and to rethink 
the entire issue before making a definitive 
choice. 
Justification 
25 
Research involving groupthink and whether or not a decision-
making body was engaging in groupthink strategy is an extremely 
new area of group research. Prior to the 1980s and prior to 
Janis' identification and explanation of groupthink, research 
in this particular area of group communication was practically 
nonexistent. While it is apparent from the review of group 
research that numerous studi~s have explored the dynamics of 
how groups and individual group members attain prestige and 
arrive at decisions, it is nonetheless true that one particular 
area was seldom researched. This is the phenomenon of how 
groups are persuaded to render faulty and even grossly dangerous 
and costly decisions. The most recent example of such a 
disasterous consequence occurred in January 1986 when the 
space shuttle Challenger exploded 73 seconds after lift-off 
(Kruglanski, 1986). It is currently being debated and 
discussed by government officials and NASA whether or not 
hasty decisions were made immediately prior to that fateful 
morning. In a less dramatic manner, this study will similarly 
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attempt to investigate one decision-making governmental body to 
ascertain whether or not a groupthink mode of thinking prevailed. 
This study was undertaken with the expressed intention to add to 
and thereby increase the body of research involving groupthink. 
This and other groupthink studies will hopefully assist in 
understanding one aspect of how individuals respond in a group 
dynamic environment. 
Hypothesis 
This study is an investigation to determine whether or not 
a decision-making group rendered final decisions as a result of a 
groupthink approach to decision-making. Th~ main hypothesis is 
stated below: 
Groups that reach decisions which are contrary 
to the majority of the general public's viewpoint, 
will demonstrate a lower level of integrative 
complexity in their decision-making process, 
than groups that reach decisions which are in 
agreement with the majority of the general 
public's viewpoint. 
·-. 
In addition, the following research questions will be 
specifically explored: 
Does the degree of importance assigned to an 
issue by a group member (or other individual), 
significantly affect that individual's 
conceptual level of integrative-complexity? 
Can the 7-point integrative-complexity rating 
scale be utilized as a predictor of possible 
groupthink approaches in the decision-making 
process? 
' 
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PROCEDURE 
Transcriptions of the Daytona Beach City Commission 
meetings were researched and 12 issues of unanimous agreement 
were extracted from these transcriptions. After recording the 
topics of these 12 issues, a telephone survey was initiated. 
The purpose of the telephone survey was to ascertain whether 
or not the general public agreed with or disagreed with the 
decisions made by the city commissioners, and to measure the 
degree of importance each respondent assigned each of the 12 
issues. Following the telephone survey, the two most important 
issues and the two least important issues (according to the 
respondents) were identified. The 12 issues extracted from 
the transcriptions of the city council meetings are detailed 
below: 
1. Ban the consumption of all alcoholic beverages 
on the beaches within the city limits of 
Daytona Beach. 
2. Ban the operation and driving of any and all 
motor vehicles from the beaches within the city 
limits of Daytona Beach between the hours of one 
hour after sunset to one hour before sunrise. 
3. Ban all pets and other anim~ls from the beaches 
within the ci1ty 1 imi ts of Daytona Beach at a 11 
times of the day and night. 
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4. Charge daily ramp tolls at every approach to 
the beaches within the city limits of Daytona 
Beach. 
5. Annex and incorporate all surrounding 
municipalities into one greater Daytona Beach 
Area. 
6. Permit Halifax Cable Television, Inc., to 
provide pay television services and further 
permit Halifax Cable to increase customer 
rates accordingly. 
7. Permit the demolition of a 120-year-old hotel 
located within the city limits of Daytona Beach. 
8. Enact an ordinance the would permit current 
beach concession operators to sell their 
businesses only to the city of Daytona Beach 
(if the owners intended to sell their concession 
operations at a future time). 
9. Limit new building heights on all newly-
constructed buildings, when erected immediately 
on the oceanfront property in Daytona Beach. 
10. Close Main Street permanently to vehicular 
traffic and construct an outdoor shopping area 
in this location. 
11. Permit the temporary closing of City Island 
Park to vehicular traffic during the hours 
that the Saturday Farmer's Market is in 
operation. 
12. Permit the use of city funds to establish and 
support the position and office of a full-time 
city liason officer whose main purpose will be 
to promote television and film production . 
within the greater Daytona Beach area. 
A total of 100 completed telephone surveys was obtained. 
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The sample for the telephone survey was selected using a random 
-- . 
digit dialing method currently employed by many marketing 
research organizations. The interviewer began at a randomly 
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selected point in the greater Daytona Beach area telephone 
directory and added the number 10 to the last two digits of the 
phone number. The interviewer continued down the list of numbers, 
always adding 10 to the last two digits of each phone number 
listed until an interview was completed. Upon completion of an 
interview, the interviewer would count three columns forward in 
the phone book and resume random digit dialing in the same manner. 
This method, while it · samples many disconnected or otherwise 
unoperating numbers, allows the researcher to survey those with 
unlisted numbers as well as new listings. This method additionally 
has the benefit of being free from ordered effects which might have 
otherwise resulted. 
All completed interviews were prefaced with the interviewer 
inquiring as to whether or not the respondent was at least 18 
years of age. In the event that the respondent was not 18 year~ 
of age, he or she was thanked and another randomly placed call 
initiated. All respondents were initially informed of the 
purpose of the phone survey (completion of university coursework) 
and were further advised that their cooperation was appreciated. 
The interviewer also stressed the point that if a telephone 
resopndent would rather not participate in the brief survey, he 
or she should not hesitate to state this choice. It was also 
mentioned by the interviewer that the survey would take 
approximately five minutes to conduct. Only upon receiving 
positive answers to the previously-mentioned inquiries would an 
actual survey be conducted and completed. 
In order to be utilized as a "complete phone survey" each 
respondent was asked and had to respond to the following two 
questions: 
(1) How important, on a rating scale of 1 to 10, 
1 being the least important and 10 being the 
most important, are the following issues to 
you? 
(2) Do you agree with, disagree with, or have no 
opinion regarding the decision made on this 
issue by the Daytona Beach City Commission? 
31 
Each telephone respondent's answers were r~corded according 
to which issues were agreed upon, disagreed upon, had no option 
upon and the degree of importance each individual issue held for 
the respondents. 
Following the completion of 100 telephone survey calls, the 
results were tabulated and the two most important issues and the 
two least important issues identified. These four issues were 
judged either least important or most important by adding the 
number of telephone responses which indicated this preference. 
The four issues and whether or not the majority of the 100 
respondents agreed with or disagreed .with the decision(s) made 
by the city commission are itemized below: 
AlBl: IMPORTANT AND AGREED WITH THE CITY COUNCIL'S 
DECISION: 
"Limit new building heights on all newly-
constructed buildings, when erected immediately 
on the oceanfront property in Daytona Beach." 
A2Bl: IMPORTANT AND DISAGREED WITH THE CITY COUNCIL'S 
DECISION: 
11 Ban the operation and driving of any and all 
motor vehicle(s) from the beaches within the city 
limits of Daytona Beach from one hour after sunset 
to one hour before sunrise." 
AlB2: UNIMPORTANT AND AGREED WITH THE CITY COUNCIL'S 
DECISION: 
11 Pe rm i t Ha l i fax Ca bl e Te 1 e v i s i on , I n c . , to prov i de 
pay television services and further permit Halifax 
Cable to increase customer rates accordingly." 
A2B2: UNIMPORTANT AND DISAGREED WITH THE CITY COUNCIL'S 
DECISION: 
"Permit the demolition of a 100-year-old hotel 
located within the city limits of Daytona Beach. 11 
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Having identified by the telephone survey which were the two 
least important and which were the two most important issues, the 
research into the minutes of the city commission meetings continued. 
The aforementioned four issues were examined to determine on what 
date(s) each of the issues was discussed by the commission members. 
Upon locating the appropriate time and date interval in the 
meeting's transcriptions, each individual issue was read and 
scrutinized by the researcher. The researcher commenced by 
counting how many statements in total were verbalized by the 
group members on each particular issue. In this context, a 
statement was defined as: an opinion, thought, or idea which 
was spoken until either the speaker concluded the thought or 
until ~omeone else interrupted. The four issues and their 
respective total number of statements are listed accordingly: 
r 
AlBl: 
A2Bl: 
AlB2: 
A2B2: 
IMPORTANT AND AGREED - 485 statements 
IMPORTANT AND DISAGREED - 422 statements 
UNIMPORTANT AND AGREED - 508 statements 
UNIMPORTANT AND DISAGREED - 228 statements 
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Utilizing random number tables (Glass and Stanley, 1970; 
Leedy, 1980; and Winer, 1962), 100 statements were selected from 
the total number of statements for each issue. Each of these 
100 randomly selected statements was copied exactly as it 
appeared in the transcriptions. The researcher carefully 
proofread each of these 100 statements after recording them 
from the official minutes of the group meetings to ensure 
authenticity and accuracy. This same procedure was followed 
for every one of the four issues. Eventually, the researcher 
compiled 400 randomly selected verbatim statements made by the 
city commission members. 
Each 100 statements pertaining to one of the four issues 
was then coded to ascertain the degree of integrative-complexity 
evident within. Three coders who had been previously trained 
by the researcher in the utilization and technique of the 
integrative-complexity measuring instrument were employed. All 
three coders were blind regarding the research questions, 
intent of the research, and the sources of the research material. 
Each of the three coders was also a state-certified instructor 
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and had attained at least the Master's Degree level in his or her 
professional career of teacher education. 
Each of the 400 statements was coded utilizing the 7-point 
integrative-complexity scale developed by Driver, Schroder and 
Streufert (1977). The integrative-complex·ity scale has been 
successfully utilized in previous research studies to determine 
the manner in which individuals reach decisions in a group 
situation. Statements made by the group members (of the Daytona 
Beach City Commission) were rated according to this scale to 
determine how members were processing information and how their 
subsequent statements reflected this processing behavior and 
outlook (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977; Suedfeld, Tetlock, and 
Ramirez, 1977; and Tetlock, 1979). 
According to Driver et al. (1977), integrative-comlpexity 
reflects the information-processing capabilities of the individual. 
The concept stems from a general position that problem-solving, 
decision-making, and similar cognitive processes vary across 
individuals and across discussion situations. 
Integrative-complexity is a dimension of information-processing 
characterized at one pole (low end of the scale) by simple responses, 
gross distinctions, rigidity, and restricted information usage; 
and at . the other pole (high end of the scale) by complexity, fine 
distinctions, ~flexibility, the entertaining of alternative 
suggestions, and more extensive information search and usage. 
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Further indicators of decreased integrative-complexity 
include: a lessened likelihood of accurately distinguishing 
between relevant and irrelevant information; a reduced search for 
new information; the suppression of ignoring of unpleasant inputs; 
long-term plans tend to be ignored in favor of stimulus-bound 
reactions; and responses and attitudes become increasingly 
stereotyped (Suedfeld and Tetlock, 1977). 
At the lower end of the scale, statements and decisions 
are characterized by anchoring around a few salient reference 
points; the perception of only one side of an argument or problem; 
the ignoring of differences or similarities among points of view; 
the perceiving of other members or participants, courses of action 
and other possibilities as being either totally good or totally 
bad; and a search for rapid and absolute solutions in order to 
achieve a group consensus with little or no uncertainty. At the 
higher (complex) end of the scale, there exists a flexible and 
open method of information-seeking and processing with others; 
the ability to consider multiple points of view simultaneously and 
then to incorporate these ideas and respond flexibly to them; and 
the notion that positive group decision-making is frequently a time-
consuming and exhaustive process. 
According to Tetlock (1979), measurements derived from 
the integrative-complexity scale will: 
r 
(1) Tend to become less integrative (lower range) as 
the group assumes a groupthink posture; and 
(2) Tend to become more integrative (higher range) as 
36 
the group displays openness and explores alternatives. 
Consequently, such a group would not be subject to 
groupthink behavior. 
The three independent coders read, evaluated and then coded 
each of the 40 statements (100 statements for each of the four 
issues) with a number from one to seven according to the 7-point 
integrative-complexity scale. The figure below illustrates the 
scale used for measuring verbal responses during a group discussion 
situation. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Low Medium Medium High 
Low High 
Figure 1. Scale Used for Scoring Verbal Responses 
The scale represents a continuum from low to high levels of 
integrative complexity. At the present level of knowledge regarding 
integrative-complexity responses, this study attempted to define 
four gross points along this scale (1, 3, 5, and 7) and provide 
for a point of transition between each (2, 4, and 6). The major 
requirement of reliable and valid scoring was a thorough 
understanding of each gross point of the scale and the ability 
of each of the three coders to discern which of the gross points 
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aligned with the statements made by the group members. A brief 
description of each of the gross points (1, 3, 5, and 7) follows: 
Low integration index (scale value 1): To assign a score 
of 1, the rater must decide that the response could be 
generated by a single fixed rule, and that no alternative 
interpretations were considered or solicited. Specific 
indications of a low integration index include: (a) viewing 
conflict, uncertainty, or ambiguity as unpleasant or a flaw 
or a weakness in people or functions; (b) seeking fast 
closure or resolution; (c) offering a specific guide or 
rule to reduce conflict; (d) implying that an absolute 
solution can be found; and (e) presenting only one side 
of a problem while ignoring differences and similarities 
with other viewpoints . 
. Medium low integration index (scale value 3): To assign 
a score of 3, the statement must clearly represent the 
availability of alternative ways of dealing with the issue 
being discussed. Specific operations include: (a) the 
mentioning of similarities and differences between views 
without considering relationships; (b) the specification 
of at least two different interpretations of the issue 
in the statement being examined; (c) the presence of 
11 either-or 11 type of responses; (d) probability statements 
about the occurrence of different views ·or outcomes; 
(e) reactions against any absolute statements when aired 
by other group members; and (f) the considering and 
availability of alternative solutions to solving the 
problem being discussed. 
The very fact of generating alternatives is related to 
a negativistic outlook by some individuals. However, 
in this context and in this measurement purpose; a 
score of 3 implies the presence of alternative 
interpretations regardless of the positivity or 
negativity of the statement. 
Medium high integration index (scale value 5): For a 
statement to be rated at the third level along the 
integrative-complexity scale, it must give evidence 
not only of alternative interpretations but also of 
the use of comparison rules for considering the joint 
application of these alternatives. Specific indications 
include: (a) the integration of two conflicting or 
differing interpretations so as to preserve and not 
"ward off" the conflict; (b) evidence that the statement 
implies the ability to take another person's intentions 
(or perspectives) into account and to relate different 
perceptions of different people (group members); (c) the 
implication that one's behavior is affected by the way 
another behaves, as in a give-and-take strategy game; 
(d) a view of social relationships as anchored in mutual 
responsibility (as opposed to fixed beliefs or rules), 
in which each person can 11 place himself or herself in the 
other person's shoes 11 ; and (e) the consideration of 
alternate reasons for similarities and differences 
between views. 
High integration index (scale value 7): Statements are 
given a rating of 7 on this scale when they not only 
state or imply alternative ways of dealing with an 
issue but also consider the possible outcomes of these 
alternatives. Such statements are relativistic rather 
than absolutistic and occur rather infrequently in group 
discussions involving issues which are unique to this 
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study. It has been stated in the manual of the integrative-
complexity scale that perhaps very few individuals use such 
complex rules of information processing outside the realm 
of science or philosophy. Responses that indicate the 
simultaneous operation of alternatives and give some 
evidence of the consideration of functional relations 
between them are given a score of 6. Specific references 
must usually be inferred because group members seldom 
relate all steps in such complex thought processes. 
Therefore, to be assigned a rating of 7, a statement 
would have to include: (a) conflicting alternatives 
that are viewed as leading to new organizations and 
information; (b) utilization of alternatives through 
exploratory action in order to gain new information; 
(c) the consideration of relationships among similarities 
and differences between the sides of a problem or question, 
and development of relationships between alternate reasons 
as to why these differences and similarities exist; and 
(d) the production of more "connectedness" between 
alternatives by theorizing as to why these reasons 
exist. 
Inter-rater Reliability 
In all instances, three coders scored each of the the 400 
statements. It was imperative, in the interest of validity, 
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that all three coders understood the theoretical variables 
previously explained. The main question which all three coders 
had to continuously ask themselves during the coding process was 
basically, "Regardless of what the statement says or implies, 
what complexity (scale poi~t 1, 3, 5, or 7) would be required to 
generate such a statement or response from this group member?" 
The following table illustrates how statements and/or responses 
to the stimulus word "Rules ... " would be coded depending upon 
the way the individual completed the statement. 
TABLE 1 
EXAMPLES OF RESPONSES TO THE STIMULUS WORD "RULES 
CODED AT POINTS ALONG THE INTEGRATION INDEX SCALE 
II 
SCALE POINT 
1 
2 
RESPONSES 
(a) "are made to be followed. They give 
direction to a project or life or anything. 
They should not be broken except in 
extreme circumstances." 
(b) 
(a) 
"are absolutely ridiculous. Rules are 
restraining the human being who should 
be free and thinking for himself or 
herself. Persons who make rules want to 
be masters and .make others followers." 
"are made to be obeyed in most cases. 
They are made for a reason after all. 
If a rule doesn't seem adequate any 
longer, it can be broken. Since huma~ 
beings make rules, the rules are fallible 
also." 
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SCALE POINT RESPONSES 
3 
4 
5 . 
.. . 
(b) "When I am unable to see the importance for 
the reason behind the rule, I'd like to 
disregard it but can't because of the 
consequences. I try to understand why a 
a rule or law is, but sometimes I can't. 11 
(a) "People seem to forget that rules are not 
ends in themselves. They were made by us, 
not created by their own will, for our 
benefit. People, for the most part, often 
don't see beyond the point of the rules, 
don't look for the underlying reasons." 
(b) "are usually made with the intention of 
doing someone or society some good. 
Often, over time, they become distorted 
and meaningless and too few people are 
helped by them. Then, if it cannot be 
be easily enforced, it is virtually 
disregarded." 
(a) "can be irritating when they interfere 
with one's life. But it's important to 
remember that they have been carefully 
thought out. They are in no sense 
absolute, but can provide a relative 
measure of security from others bent on 
their own interests as well as order. 11 
(b) "are sometimes to be taken with a grain 
of salt. Many are undoubtedly wise and 
should not be broken just for the sake of 
nonconformity. Society must continually 
examine its rules, however, to ensure that 
none are unjust or obsolete. 11 
(a) "must be inspected before they are obeyed 
blindly. Obeying a 1 bad 1 rule ( 1 bad 1 -
morally, socially, etc.), he or she gives 
it strength. Rules should be examined by 
society and changed, if necessary, by the 
process of law or obsolesence or enough 
people refusing to obey them publicly. 11 
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SCALE POINT RESPONSES 
6 
7 
(b) "are necessary for a society to function 
well. However, rules should not be so 
strictly adhered to that they cannot be 
modified when circumstances alter. The 
purpose or effects of rules are more 
important than the rules themselves." 
(a) 11 represent one type of mechanism by which 
man tries to regulate his society . These 
rules differ according to different environ-
mental and sociological factors and are in 
an endless process of change, within the 
same group and from group to group. 11 • 
(b) "are means which mankind attempts to 'come 
to grips' with factors which influence his/ 
her world daily. Often these rules must be 
altered as the process of living in a modern 
society dictates." 
(a) "serve mankind and should be interpreted in 
terms of their ends, not their letter 'of 
the law'. They have a purpose both for 
the governed (keeping order) and for those 
who govern (order, maintaining status quo, 
etc.). This purpose can and perhaps should, 
change from time and place and, hopefully, 
lead to a better, broader basis of 
understanding humans and making rules. 11 
(b) "are made for everyone but are interpreted 
in many ways. It depends on the point of 
view of the interpreter. It is in this 
very process of interpretation that a 
society stays dynamic and changes and 
grows. 11 
(Driver, Schroder, and Streufert, 1977). 
The following table will further demonstrate how each of the 
statements would be categorized along the dimensions of the 
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integrative-complexity scale if group members were asked to 
complete the thought beginning with the words, "When I am in 
doubt ... 11 
TABLE 2 
EXAMPLES OF RESPONSES TO THE STIMULUS WORDS "WHEN I AM IN 
SCALE POINT 
1 
2 
3 
DOUBT . 11 CODED AT POINTS ALONG THE 
INTEGRATION INDEX SCALE 
RESPONSES 
(a) "I make a rapid, and I hope (!), sound 
decision. Doubts can make for a very 
troubled and unhappy life if one permits 
them to. 11 
(b) "I try to weigh things carefully, but 
it really comes down to following my 
hunch or acting on impulse. I'd rather 
follow impulse than do nothing at all. 11 
(a) 11 ! do my best to assess all relevant 
data. Then I see if I . feel strongly any 
way as intuition is sometimes more 
reliable than reason. If I have no 
definite feelings, I think the problem 
out and make a 'rational' decision 
based upon probability. 11 
(b) "I think through what is puzzling me 
and try to find my feelings and 
thoughts about .it. I will use 
reference works if the problem is 
academic or just ponder if it is a 
mora 1 issue. 11 
(a) "I find that it often comes because I 
thought I knew the full details about 
something and then a surprising 
occurrence showed that I didn't know 
SCALE POINT 
3 
4 
5 
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RESPONSES 
(a) continued 
all the answers after all. We should 
try to get as much information as 
possible in order to form tentative 
conclusions but remember that they 
aren't the final ones." 
(b) I oftentimes ask someone who I think 
should know. By doing this, you can 
often understand your problem better. 
Howev.er, sometimes it is better to 
work it out yourself. 11 
(a) "I talk to other people about the 
problem and think about it for a while. 
There are problems where there is an 
objective answer. Other problems have 
several solutions, and I try to choose 
the most advantageous one." 
(b) "I think about it and sometimes also 
consult the feelings of others. I then 
take these impressions from others and 
use them to supplement or modify my own. 
By this means, I am often able to make 
a decision. 
(a) "I think the problem through first by 
myself. I may also seek advice from 
those more familiar with the subject. I 
try to get as many viewpoints as possible 
so that my thoughts will have another 
direction." 
(b) "I generally back off from the situation 
to re-examine the whole problem. Often 
this re-examination discloses new 
avenues--and often opens me up for 
c r i ti c i s m for my v a c il l at i n g met hods ! " 
SCALE POINT 
6 
7 
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RESPONSES 
(a) "I try to find out what others think. 
Then I usually develop my own point of 
view out of those I've discussed with 
others. I rather enjoy doubt; it forces 
me to change my opinions so that I can 
understand things better." 
- ( b) "I try to figure out a reasonab 1 e answer, 
considering all the available evidence. 
I usually still have doubts (even new 
ones!) after this, and I consult other 
people in order to consider their opinions. 
The result is hardly a final solution, but 
it usually serves as a springboard for 
further considerations." 
(a) "I don't know, as a rule, of any standard 
method for alleviating the doubt. It 
usually seems best to medidate upon it 
rather than plan an immediate course of 
action, because often under the influence 
and goal of a doubt, one comes up with 
ideas and thoughts about it that he never 
had before--and even this can lead to new 
ideas." 
(b) "I think about it in some detail. It 
almost always means that I start re-
evaluating things. Often I find I 
change what I believe in if it no 
longer seems to fit a new situation--it 
all depends on how useful the old and new 
ways of thinking are." 
(Driver, Schroder, and Streufert, 1977).· 
As· a final illustration of how statements are coded according 
to the 7-point~ . integrative-complexity scale, the following table 
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summarizes the scale points used for assessing the conceptual 
levels of statements made by the individual group participants. 
TABLE 3 
SCALE POINTS USED FOR ASSESSING THE CONCEPTUAL LEVEL OF 
STATEMENTS MADE BY GROUP MEMBERS OF A DECISION-MAKING 
BODY; ACCORDING TO THE DEGREE OF INTEGRATIVE-COMPLEXITY 
SCALE POINT 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 . 
DESCRIPTION 
Presents only one side of a problem. Ignores 
differences, similarities, and gradations. 
One side of the problem presented and supported 
much more fully than the other. Opposing views 
perceived as compartmentalized or negative. 
No interrelationships considered. 
Two or more views clearly differentiated. 
Similarities and differen~es implied or 
presented. One view can be opposed, but it 
is still understood. 
Includes all involved under scale point 3 
but begins to "consider" the similarities 
and differences between viewpoints. At this 
level, consideration is expressed .•• as 
qualifications of each ... (for example, 
II • ·1 b t 11 ) s1m1 ar, u . . . • 
Considers alternate and conflicting reasons 
for perceived simil~rities and differences 
between views in verbalizing the statement. 
Begins to consider relationships, not only 
among direct similarities and differences . 
between sides of the issue, but also relation-
ships between alternate reasons as to why the 
differences and similarities occur. 
SCALE POINT 
7 
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TABLE 7 - CONTINUED 
DESCRIPTION 
The consideration of ideas and suggestions 
which include relational linkages between 
alternate views. Such ideas and suggestions 
(either expressed negatively or positively) 
are encouraged and solicited in the perception 
that additional input can only assist in the 
decision-rendering process. 
Following the coding process, the researcher tallied all three 
individual rating scores. For any statement, then 3 would be the 
lowest possible score and 21 would be the highest possible rating 
score. Each of the 400 statements was tallied in this manner to 
yield a composite rating score for each statement. The integrative-
complexity ratings were then analyzed with a 2 (agreement/disagreement) 
X 2 (topic importance/unimportance) analysis of variance. 
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to investigate whether or not a 
decision-making group rendered final decisions as a result of a 
groupthink approach to decision-making. 
H1 stated that: "Groups that reach decisions which are 
contrary to the majority of the general 
public's viewpoint will demonstrate a 
lower level of integrative complexity in 
their decision-making process than groups 
that reach decisions which are in agreement 
with the majority of the general public's. 
viewpoint. 11 
Research question number one asked the following: 
"Does the degree of importance assigned to 
an issue by a group member (or other 
individual), significantly affect that 
individual's conceptual level of integrative-
complexity?" 
The range for the integrative-complexity rating scale was 21. 
Group means for the four categories are as follows: 
AlBl: ImQortant and Agreed 8.79 
A2Bl: ImQortant and Disagreed - 8.12 
A182: UnimQortant and Agreed 8.82 
A2B2: UnimQortant and Disagreed 8.49 
Table 4 demonstrates the ANOVA summary for the effects of 
agreement and importance as they related to integrative-complexity 
of discussion. · .. 
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TABLE 4 
ANOVA SUMMARY FOR EFFECTS OF AGREEMENT ANO IMPORTANCE 
ON INTEGRATIVE-COMPLEXITY OF DISCUSSION 
SOURCE MS df 
48 
F 
A {Importance) 
B (Agreement) 
AB (Interaction) 
Within Ce 11 
0.250 
0.040 
0.029 
0.201 
1 
1 
1 
1. 244 
0.199 
0.144 
396 
The results shown in Table 4 indicate that H1 was not supported 
in respect to the agreement variable. Additionally, research 
question one must be answered in the negative response. According 
to the statistical results, the degree of importance assigned to an 
issue by a group member did not significantly affect that 
· individual's conceptual level of integrative-complexity. The 
results illustrate that neither main effect (Importance of topic 
or Agreement) prod~ced significance. That is, integrative-
complexity was not affected by either variable. Also, the AB 
interaction (Importance/Agreement) was non-significant. 
Research question number two asked the following: 
"Can the 7-point integrative-complexity 
rating scale be utilized as a predictor 
of possible groupthink approaches in the 
decision-making process?" 
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This question specifically involved the examination of ratings 
utilized on the integrative-complexity scale. The main premise 
was that certain groups could be undergoing communicative behavior 
changes according to how they scored on the integrative-complexity 
scale. More exactly, lower ratings were thought to indicate a 
rigid and more elementary approach to problem-solving situations. 
Table 5 illustrates how the four groups were rated by the three 
coders according to the seven dimensions used on the integrative-
complexity scale. This table lists the number of times (and the 
percentage of the overall total) each of the seven rating dimensions 
was marked by the coders. Each of the four categories included 
100 statements made by the city commissioners during meeting 
situations. Since there were three coders performing the task, 
there are 300 total statements included for each of the four 
categories. 
TABLE 5 
FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE EACH OF THE SEVEN POINTS ON THE 
INTEGRATIVE-COMPLEXITY SCALE WERE SELECTED BY THE CODERS 
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CATEGORY (GROUP) RATING POINT FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
Important and Agreed 1 64 21% 
2 97 32% 
3 36 12% 
4 49 16% 
5 28 9% 
6 21 7% 
7 5 2% 
Important and Disagreed 1 72 24% 
2 105 35% 
3 26 9% 
4 54 18% 
5 29 10% 
6 13 4% 
7 1 .3% 
Unimportant and Agreed 1 67 22% 
2 92 31% 
3 23 8% 
4 52 17% 
5 37 12% 
6 24 8% 
7 5 2% 
Unimportant and Disagreed 1 46 15% 
2 101 34% 
3 59 20% 
4 56 19% 
5 24 8% 
6 10 3% 
7 4 1% 
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According to Table 5, rating point two was used more 
frequently than any of the other six rating points. In every 
category except the "Unimportant and Disagreed" category, rating 
point number one was the next most popular rating for the three 
coders. As was noted earlier, rating point one is indicative of 
a low level of integreative-complexity and is characterized by a · 
rigid, unquestioning and generally-closed view of group interaction 
and participation. At the higher levels of the scale (rating points 
four through seven), the frequency with which these dimensions were 
used by the coders decreased substantially. 
Table 6 illustrates the percentage of the time (according to 
the four categories), that the three coders were in total 
agreement, two-thirds agreement, or no agreement whatsoever. 
TABLE 6 
PERCENTAGE OF THE TIME IN WHICH THE THREE CODERS WERE IN TOTAL 
AGREEMENT, TWO-THIRDS AGREEMENT, OR NO AGREEMENT 
TOTAL TWO-THIRDS NO CATEGORY (GROUP) AGREEMENT AGREEMENT AGREEMENT 
ImQorant and Agreed 51% 37% 12% 
ImQortant and Disagreed 35% 64% 1% 
UnimQortant and Agreed 44% 50% 6% 
UnimQortant and· Disagreed 20% 67% 13% 
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Table 6 demonstrates that the greatest percentage of total 
agreement among the three coders occurred during the codings for 
the "Important and Agreed" category. The lowest level of total 
agreement among the three coders occurred in the "Unimportant and 
Disagreed" category. In this category also ("Unimportant and 
Disagreed"), the three coders disagreed among themselves more 
(13%) than in any of the other categories. When all the four 
categories are compressed to yield an average percentage (for 
levels of agreement among the three coders), the figures are as 
follows: 
Average Total Agreement 
Average 2/3's Agreement 
Average; No Agreement 
37.5% 
54.5% 
8.0% 
100.0% 
DISCUSSION 
This descriptive study was an investigation to determine 
whether or not a city governmental body rendered unanimous decisions 
due to a groupthink approach to decision-making. Such a groupthink 
approach was examined by researching the transcriptions of city 
meetings and coding the statements which pertained to selected 
issues. Statements were coded to determine whether lower levels 
of integrative-complexity were deciding factors in whether or 
not a group would indeed be characterized by th~ groupthink 
phenomenon. 
The group which was examined was the Daytona Beach City 
Commission; comprised of six city commissioners and the Mayor 
of Daytona Beach. All statements utilized in this study were 
obtained from transcriptions of these city commission meetings. 
Each one of the 400 statements was therefore spoken (and recorded 
¥erbatim) by one of these seven members of the Daytona Beach City 
Commission. 
H1 stated: Groups that reach decisions which are contrary to the majority of the general public's view-
point, will demonstrate a lower level of 
integrative complexity in their decision-
making process, than groups that reach decisions 
which are in agreement with the majority of the 
general public's viewpoint. 
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The two research questions were: 
Does the degree of importance assigned to an issue 
by a group member (or other individual), significantly 
affect that individual's conceptual level of 
integrative-complexity? 
Can the 7-point integrative-complexity rating scale 
be utilized as a predictor of possible groupthink 
approaches in the decision-making process? 
Of the 12 issues utilized in the phone survey responses, it 
was not surprising that the issue pertaining to the ban on night-time 
beach driving received the most opposition and vigorous debate. The 
majority of the telephone respondents indicated _that they considered 
this the most important issue of the 12. Although initial 
discussion of this issue during the city commission meetings 
produced several instances of dissension among the commissioners, 
they nevertheless decided to enact this restriction unanimously. 
Interestingly, the three independent coders rated the statements 
on the integrative-complexity scale as mostly toward the lower end 
of the scale. However, groupthink was not indicated when these 
rating scores were statistically compared with the other categories. 
A possible explanation could be that the three coders rated the 
statements from a personal definition instea~ of a more objective 
interpretation of the rating dimensions. 
The category which generated the most statements was category 
Al82: Unimportant and Agreed. There were 86 fewer statements 
verbalized during the discussion of the night beach driving 
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restriction than were generated during the process of discussing 
the cable television issue. This abbreviated group discussion 
was one of the symptoms that Janis (1983) identified as a 
possible indication that groupthink was present (or at least more 
likely to occur). It could also be surmised that group members were 
under time deadlines to finalize discussion on these issues. It is 
obvious when reviewing the meeting transcriptions that certain group 
members expressed impatience with the pace of the proceedings. 
Perhaps the mayor (or other city officials) had previously imposed 
deadlines for the cessation of discussion on these issues. Whether 
or not certain time pressures were evident is unknown to the 
researcher. However, if group members did sense an urgency to 
conclude stating their opinions on certain issues, these opinions 
would quite naturally be verbalized in a concise manner. Consequently, 
these brief and rather blunt statements would be rated on the lower 
end of the integrative-complexity scale. 
In theory, low integrative-complexity should indicate groupthink. 
The integrative-complexity scale was utilized successfully to predict 
behavior in other group settings. Tetlock and Ramirez (1977) and 
Tetlock (1979) both demonstrated that lower levels of integrative-
complexity results prior to groups rendering rapidly-formulated 
decisions. However, in both of these studies, the i~sues 
-. 
investigated were substantially more dramatic than the issues 
discussed in the Daytona Beach City Commission meetings. This 
may have been one of the main reasons that this study found 
little relationship between lower rating scores and possible 
groupthink development. 
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Driver (1977) explained that 11 integrative-complexity 
reflects the information-processing capabilities of the 
individual." p. 240 In the meetings which this researcher 
investigated, there seemed to be an urgency to complete the 
proceedings as quickly as possible. As mentioned previously, 
several members seemed to become impatient with the meeting 
format and discussion. As a result, if one's interest is waning, 
one's level of "processing information" will similarly diminish. 
This may also have accounted for little difference among four 
groups when the data were analyzed. 
Another factor which could have possibly influenced the 
results of this study concerned the personalities and biases 
of the three independent coders. Although the three coders 
were thoroughly trained and tested for their degree of accuracy 
prior to coding the statements, human error in judgment was 
obviously present. In the 8% of the statements, all three coders 
rated the statements differently, although .usually only one or 
two rating points away from the other. But even a small variation 
of one or two rating dimensions could have had an impact on the 
final outcomes of the study. Unfortunately, in this type of 
coding process, human biases will be present and must be 
acknowledged. Until the time when some different measuring 
device is established for predicting certain indicators of 
I 
groupthink formation, the human-bias factor will continue 
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to have an influence on results. The coder had to be cognizant 
that he/she was not evaluating the meaning of the statement but 
only the degree of 11 integrative-complexity 11 contained within that 
statement. Careful consideration had to be undertaken in each of 
the 400 rating procedures if statistically reliable data were to 
be gathered. Unavoidable misinterpretations may have resulted 
due to this rather complex rating instrument. 
The 11 Important and Disagreed 11 category received the most 
rating points on the first and second rating dimensions as indicated 
by Table 5. This was the 11 ban on night-time beach driving" issue 
and, as evident in the transcriptions, many of the statements were 
rigidly promoted and/or defended. Nevertheless, the group 
eventually voted unanimously against the majority on this particular 
' issue. What is interesting is that for the "Important and Agreed" 
category, the percentages were quite similar. Although both of the 
issues were opposite in respect to agreement and disagreement, the 
percentages of statements which were rated . accordingly on the 
integrative-complexity scale remained consistently low. The data 
suggest that w~ether a commissioner was supporting or disagreeing 
with an issue mattered little in the final rating process. In 
either situation, lower ranges of integrative-complexity and lower 
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levels of information processing techniques were documented. It 
can only be conjectured as to the reasons for such lower levels 
of information processing by the city commissioners. A possible 
explanation may have been the (unknown) constraints previously 
mentioned. Once again, extraneous variables which may have had 
an influence upon the results of this study remain elusive. 
Analysis of variance performed on the data did not reveal a 
significant degree (at the .05 level) for any of the four categories. 
Differences were slight for all of the statistical comparisons 
performed among the four categories. It was evident, however, 
that the majority of the rating points were coded as either one, 
two, or three by each of the independent coders. It may be that 
this is the most revealing indication as to why significance was 
not obtained. If the city commissioners, for example, had 
verbalized more statements which indicated more complex information-
processing, then the rating points would have been coded higher on 
the overall scale. 
A suggestion for future research would be to elicit more 
complete (and possibly more complex) thoughts from the individuals 
involved in the decision-making process. Instead of extracting 
only one complete statement, future studies might incorporate all 
statements which are similar into one complete thought pattern 
and then code this "thought pattern." In this way, perhaps a 
more accurate indication of the degree of information-processing 
could be acquired before analyzing the data. 
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The results listed on Table 5 illustrate that the three 
coders were rather consistent in their judgments. In almost every 
instance, the lower three rating points received the most 11 codings, 11 
and the higher three rating points received the fewest number of 
11 codings. 11 
The matter of whether or not the perceived degree of "importance" 
affected results also did not achieve any measure of significance. 
It was obvious that the telephone survey respondents made definite 
distinctions between what . they considered important and unimportant 
issues. But the city commissioners did not seem to assign particular 
characteristics to either category. As stated previously, no degree 
of significance was obtained for statements relative to important 
versus unimportant issues. Levels of integrative-complexity and 
levels of information processing accompanying such statements were 
essentially static. 
Implications for Future Research 
Descriptive studies of groupthink similar to the one herein 
presented can only contribute further to our knowledge of the 
groupthink phenomenon. Future research should attempt to develop 
precise techniques which could be utilized to more accurately 
gauge degrees and severity of groupthink. It is imperative that 
research conttnue to examine the underlying reasons for groupthink 
behavior(s) in the interest of preventing major political as well as 
social upheavals. 
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There are other elements of groupthink that have as yet been 
unexplored. In addition to the spoken statements, non-verbal cues 
could also be influencing the levels of groupthink in a decision-
making association. Leadership role assignment should also be 
examined in future studies of groupthink. Additionally, male and 
female inter-relationships, and the general group dynamics of 
gender differences in group situations, would seem appropriate 
research concerns in groupthink studies. Thus far, research in the 
area of groupthink behavior(s) has mainly examined only males in 
group decision-making situations. Females shou1d be studied; both 
separately and jointly with males in group decision-making 
circumstances to discern patterns of similarities and differences. 
One suggestion for a study which involves use of the integrative-
complexity scale would be to somehow simplify the rating point 
definitions. In general, the scale seemed quite useful as a 
possible predictor of groupthink behavior. But the level of 
: sophistication required to effectively implement the instrument 
is rather acute. If a simpler version of the integrative-complexity 
scale could be devised, future research studies of groupthink would 
seemingly benefit. 
SUMMARY 
The phenomenon referred to as groupthink behavior remains an 
under-researched area of communication study. An enormous amount 
of communication research has considered the dynamics of groups and 
how groups interact. Few group research studies however, have 
examined the pressures which group members undergo in the decision-
rendering process. This study did attempt to identify possible 
influences and other predictors of groupthink behavior. While 
groupthink behavior was not observed, insights into the process 
of possible groupthink behavior formation were brought forth as 
a result of this study. An underlying theme was that groups 
cannot be easily categorized or identified. Groups need to be 
scrutinized attentively to ascertain more accurately the causes 
of their behavior(s). It is only through close examination and 
further research that we will finally begin to understand reasons 
behind group decisions. We must continue to explore ways to 
produce the most positive outcomes from group decisions. It is 
imperative to our co-existence as members of the "global village." 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
Theoretical Analysis of Groupthink 
63 
Theroretical Analysis of Groupthink 
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APPENDIX B 
Information Regarding The Statements 
And the Respective Coding Values 
Information Regarding the Statements 
And the Respective Coding Values 
All statements utilized in this study are on file at the 
Department of Communication, University of Central Florida, 
Orlando. The individual coding values pertaining to each of 
these statements are also on file at the same location. 
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